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Abstract This paper bolsters Prescott’s (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneap. Q. Rev.
28(1):2–13, 2004) claim that high taxes are responsible for lackluster labor market
performance in Continental European countries. We develop a life-cycle model with
endogenous skill formation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement.
Labor taxation distorts not only labor supply, but also education and retirement de-
cisions. Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate labor tax distortions on retire-
ment. Education subsidies can nevertheless cushion the adverse impact of taxation
on skill formation. Feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement are
important. The model is simulated with realistic behavioral elasticities that are con-
sistent with microeconometric evidence. If, besides labor supply, also learning and
retirement are endogenous, the uncompensated (compensated) elasticity of the tax
base equals 0.46 (0.85), which is more than twice as large as the standard uncompen-
sated (compensated) labor supply elasticity of 0.18 (0.40). Furthermore, life-cycle
interactions between education, working, and retirement are quantitatively important
and the interactions raise all behavioral elasticities substantially. For example, the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity increases with one-half due to life-cycle in-
teractions (to 0.26). We demonstrate that low European labor supply can be fully
explained by taxation without relying on unrealistically high labor supply elastici-
ties. Reducing labor market distortions, cutting benefit levels, lowering tax rates, and
making (early) retirement actuarially more fair, therefore, boosts labor supply, delays
retirement, and stimulates skill formation. In addition, high education subsidies are
needed in large welfare states to offset explicit and implicit tax burdens on human
capital investment.
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1 Introduction
In his influential article, Prescott (2004) provoked a heated debate on whether the
high levels of taxation, which are associated with large welfare states, are responsi-
ble for the poor European labor market performance. Alesina et al. (2005) responded
and demonstrated that taxation can only explain the European experience with em-
pirically implausibly large elasticities of labor supply. As an alternative explanation,
they propose a “social multiplier” in leisure demand, which creates a culture of leisure
in which Europeans do not wish to work so hard as Americans do.1 Until now, the
debate is far from settled, and this paper sheds new light on the issue.
We argue that labor supply is not the only relevant choice margin. Indeed, edu-
cation and retirement are crucial determinants of labor market entry and exit and,
therefore, of the size of the tax base. Education and retirement are both affected
by taxation. According to the Le Châtelier Principle, the elasticity of the tax base
is expected to increase substantially when more than one margin is affected by in-
come taxation (Diamond and Mirrlees 2002). Income taxation reduces investments
in human capital if not all education expenditures are tax-deductible forgone labor
earnings. Indeed, direct costs are around one-quarter of total monetary costs (Trostel
1993).2 The labor tax directly distorts retirement decisions because utility from re-
tirement is not taxed, whereas continued work is. This direct impact of labor taxation
on retirement is often neglected. Indeed, the retirement literature mainly focuses on
the implicit marginal tax rate on additional years of work due to the presence of actu-
arially unfair (early) retirement incomes; see, for example, Gruber and Wise (1999).
An exception is Duval (2004), who also studies the effects of the direct marginal tax
on retirement.
Furthermore, education, labor supply, and retirement interact over the life cy-
cle. Investments in human capital only pay off if human capital is utilized in the
labor market. The utilization rate of human capital increases with labor force par-
ticipation and hours worked and human capital is written off at (early) retirement.3
1Alesina et al. (2005) present anecdotal evidence in favor of their “social multiplier,” but solid empirical
evidence is lacking. This explanation is the polar opposite of theories that emphasize rivalry in consump-
tion, which results in rat-races and status seeking; see, for example, Layard (2005) If true, Americans
would work excessively hard, in comparison with Europeans. In any case, both approaches share a short
distance between assumption and conclusion; the explanation for observed behavior (too much or too little
leisure) is essentially assumed.
2Nonmonetary costs, such as effort, are probably important as well in view of the observed high financial
returns to education, which are considerably larger than the risk-free rate (Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005).
In theory, noninsurable risks and capital market failures can also explain these high returns. However,
empirically neither capital market imperfections nor risk have sufficient explanatory power to justify the
observed high returns we see in the data. See the discussion in Jacobs (2007).
3High levels of taxation, generous social benefits, and strong labor market regulations reduce labor force
participation rates, hours worked, and employment (see, e.g., Nickell 1997; Blundell and MaCurdy 1999;
Is Prescott right? Welfare state policies and the incentives to work 255
Low labor force participation rates of older workers imply that the time-horizons
over which investments in human capital are harvested are short, and the incen-
tives to invest in human capital are weakened accordingly. Similarly, incentives to
participate in the labor market, to supply labor, and to retire later improve with
higher levels of education because better-educated workers forgo higher labor earn-
ings.
The data also suggest that complementarities between investment in human capital
(skill creation), labor force participation (skill utilization), and retirement (skill de-
preciation) are important. The differences in labor force participation rates between
workers with lower secondary education and workers with a tertiary education are
double digit numbers (15–30% points). The mirror image is that unemployment rates
fall by 2–6% points when skill levels increase from lower secondary to tertiary edu-
cation (OECD 2005a). Labor force participation rates of older cohorts are also much
higher when individuals have more initial education. The difference in labor force
participation rates between older workers with less than upper-secondary and those
with tertiary education is roughly 20–30% points (OECD 2006). Skilled workers re-
tire much later than unskilled workers.
The main questions of this paper are therefore the following. How do taxes affect
skill formation (education), labor supply and retirement over the life cycle? And what
is the impact of education subsidies and actuarially unfair pensions? How important
are the complementarities between skill formation, labor effort, and retirement for
the overall impact of welfare state policies on economic incentives and overall wel-
fare?
To answer these questions, this paper develops and simulates a stylized life-cycle
model of education (skill formation), labor supply (skill utilization), and retirement
(skill depreciation). Following the human capital approach, individuals invest in hu-
man capital during initial periods of their life cycle, until the marginal costs of invest-
ing more time and resources are equal to the marginal benefits in the form of higher
future wages; see, for example, Becker (1964), and Mincer (1974). After finishing
initial education, individuals enter the labor market and utilize their human capital by
endogenously supplying labor. The labor supply decision is modeled in a standard,
neoclassical fashion. Human capital fully depreciates as individuals retire. The nov-
elty of our model is that the retirement decision is modeled in a parsimonious way as
the discrete decision to exit the labor market completely. Individuals retire when the
marginal utility benefits of retirement are equal to the marginal costs of retirement:
forgone labor earnings during the last year working.
Our theoretical model thereby contributes to the existing retirement literature. Of-
ten, researchers model retirement as a corner solution of zero labor supply by forcing
wage rates to decline after some specified age (e.g., due to health shocks), by in-
troducing work-related costs that increase with age, or by employing taste shifters
in the utility function, which raise the marginal utility from leisure over time; see,
for example, Gustman and Steinmeier (2005), and the references in de Hek and van
Saez 2002; Lalive et al. 2006). Generous early retirement and pension schemes give strong incentives to
older workers to retire many years before statutory retirement ages (Gruber and Wise 1999).
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Erp (2007). These modeling strategies have the disadvantage that the optimal retire-
ment age is to an important extent imposed by the modeling choices of the analyst,
rather than being derived from optimizing behavior. Similarly, we do not need dis-
crete choices in the labor supply decision, where labor supply takes discrete pos-
itive values before retirement, and is zero at retirement (for example, Rust 1989;
van der Klaauw and Wolpin 2005; Blau 2007). A discrete labor supply choice has
the unattractive property of being exogenous over wide intervals before retirement.
Furthermore, the life-cycle model developed in this paper avoids the analytical non-
tractability of a Stock and Wise (1990) retirement option model, which is extended
with endogenous labor supply in, for example, French (2005).
We show theoretically that taxation distorts labor supply, educational investment,
and retirement. Actuarially unfair pensions further exacerbate tax distortions on re-
tirement. Hours worked and later retirement are complementary to initial education.
Skill formation is therefore impaired when the returns to skill formation are low if
not much labor is supplied and skill utilization rates are low, and if skill deprecia-
tion is quick as a result of (early) retirement. More skill creation also boosts skill
utilization, and slows down skill depreciation because higher levels of human capital
raise the opportunity costs of leisure and retirement. Consequently, education policy
can be important to cushion the distortionary impact of taxes and actuarially unfair
pensions.
The theoretical model is simulated to quantify the impact of labor market distor-
tions, (early) retirement schemes, and education policies on incentives to learn, to
work, and to retire. We demonstrate that taxation is much more distortionary if, be-
sides labor supply, education, and retirement decisions are taken into consideration.
In particular, the uncompensated elasticity of the tax base (0.46) is more than twice
as large as the conventional uncompensated elasticity of labor supply (0.18). Further,
the conventional uncompensated labor supply elasticity increases with almost 50%
(from 0.18 to 0.26) due to interactions of labor supply with education and retirement.
Elasticities of retirement and education also substantially increase due to interactions.
Hence, feedbacks between skill formation, skill creation, and skill depreciation are
quantitatively important. To properly measure the welfare costs of welfare states, we
also computed the compensated elasticities. Again, the compensated elasticity of the
tax base (0.85) is more than twice as high as the conventional compensated labor
supply elasticity (0.40). Welfare state policies therefore create much larger distor-
tions than commonly believed. Our simulations show that low European labor supply
can be fully explained by high levels of taxation, without relying on unrealistically
high labor supply elasticities as in Prescott (2004), and without resorting to a “social
multiplier” in leisure as in Alesina et al. (2005).4
Education policy can mitigate the adverse consequences of taxes on skill forma-
tion. In particular, policies to foster human capital cannot be seen in isolation from
labor market policies, tax and benefit systems, and pension schemes. Education subsi-
dies do not only reduce the explicit tax burden on skill formation, but also the implicit
4Indeed, it is perhaps more appropriate to think of the labor supply decision in macroeconomic models as
a measure for labor supply in a broad sense, which encompasses more dimensions than only hours worked,
but, for example, also education, retirement, and the labor force participation decision.
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tax burden caused by low skill utilization (also resulting from high taxes) and quick
skill depreciation (resulting from actuarially unfair pensions). Furthermore, actuari-
ally unfair pensions severely exacerbate the preexisting labor tax distortions on retire-
ment choices. Hence, from a policy perspective it is not sufficient to restrict attention
to reducing the implicit tax on retirement alone, as the explicit tax rate stimulates
early retirement as well. Reforms in labor markets, pension systems and tax-benefit
systems may not only have direct beneficial effects on labor supply and retirement,
but may also have important dynamic efficiency gains by indirectly lowering implicit
tax wedges on skill formation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a
theory of skill formation, skill utilization, and skill depreciation. Section 3 quantita-
tively illustrates the importance of interactions between skill formation, labor mar-
kets, and pension schemes. Section 4 provides the policy conclusions.
2 A theory of skill formation, skill utilization, and skill depreciation
We develop a standard life-cycle model, which is augmented with human capital
investment, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. Labor markets are
perfectly competitive and frictionless.5 By simultaneously analyzing human capital
investment, labor supply, and retirement decisions, the model allows us to spell out
various complementarities over the life cycle.
We assume that a representative individual is born at time t = 0 and has a life-span
T , which is exogenously given. During the first stages of the life cycle, the individual
invests S years acquiring human capital while not working at all. The decision to enter
the labor market after initial education is therefore made on the extensive margin.
If the individual is in the labor force, the individual endogenously supplies labor.
Thus, labor is supplied on the intensive (hours) margin. Retirement is modeled on the
extensive margin as the decision to exit the labor market completely at age R. The
life-time time constraint states that total years in school S, in the labor market R − S,
and in retirement T − R should equal the life span T of the individual:
T = S + (R − S) + (T − R). (1)
At each date, the individual derives instantaneous utility from consumption Ct .
Only when the individual is in the labor market (S < t ≤ R), he may also derive
utility from leisure Lt . The time constraint while working states that the fraction of
time working Lt plus the fraction of time consumed as leisure Lt should be equal to
the total time endowment—which is normalized at unity—
1 = Lt + Lt , S < t ≤ R. (2)
5This is probably not the best description of the labor markets in Europe, but economic theory is still in its
infancy when it comes to studying the joint determination of labor supply, human capital formation, and
wages in noncompetitive labor markets. See Charlot and Decreuze (2007), and the references therein, for
an example.
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In this representative agent setting, one can alternatively interpret Lt as the employ-
ment rate, and Lt as the nonemployment rate. Individuals also derive utility from the
years they are retired T − R, where R denotes the retirement age.
Life-time utility of the individual is given by a time-separable function of instan-
taneous consumption and leisure felicities, and retirement utility
∫ T
0
U(Ct ) exp(−ρt)dt +
∫ R
S
V (Lt ) exp(−ρt)dt + X(T − R), (3)
with U ′(Ct ) > 0,U ′′(Ct ) < 0, V ′(Lt ) > 0, V ′′(Lt ) < 0, X′(T − R) > 0, and
X′′(T − R) < 0. ρ is the subjective rate of time preference.
This preference structure requires careful treatment of all relevant time constraints.
Double counting should be avoided by setting leisure time Lt at zero when individ-
uals are enrolled in education, or when individuals are retired, i.e., Lt ≡ 0 for t ≤ S
and R < t ≤ T . The value of retirement leisure is governed by X(T − R). Adding
leisure utility of retirement through V (Lt ) would count leisure benefits of retirement
twice. The costs of forgone labor time are measured by forgone labor earnings, as in-
dividuals spend their complete time endowment on education at the beginning of the
life-cycle. Adding disutility from education effort via V (Lt ) would count the time
costs of education twice.6
By assuming that time devoted to retirement or education is a different commod-
ity than time enjoyed as leisure during working life, we can completely separate the
labor supply decision on the intensive margin from the education and retirement de-
cisions on the extensive margin. The major advantage of doing so is that we obtain
a parsimonious description of the education and retirement decisions, and a smooth
path for labor supply over the working career. However, the utility function is also
partially endogenous, since the domain of the utility integral for leisure is determined
by endogenous education and retirement decisions. Hence, if more time is invested in
education or spent in retirement, time available in the labor market and time enjoyed
as leisure diminish.7
The individual optimally decides the number of years S in education. W(S) is
the production function of human capital. W(S) features positive but diminishing
marginal returns to additional initial schooling: W ′(S) > 0, W ′′(S) < 0. W(S) is
assumed to be constant over time. Alternatively, W(S) can be seen as the rental rate
of human capital of type S. The costs of education are earnings forgone while not
working, and constant direct costs P per year of education. All costs and benefits of
education are monetary; we ignore nonmonetary costs or benefits.
The individual starts his life with A0 in financial assets, which are normalized to
zero for convenience (A0 = 0). Borrowing on a perfect capital market at constant real
interest rate r is possible to finance the costs of living and the costs of education in the
6The separability between consumption and leisure in the utility function is needed to avoid discontinuities
in the marginal utility of consumption, since the individual only consumes hours of leisure while being in
active in the labor market, and Lt = 0 for t ≤ S and R < t ≤ T .
7The partial endogeneity of the utility function could be regarded as a drawback on theoretical grounds.
Nevertheless, other approaches to capture the retirement decision and labor supply jointly are subject to
more severe theoretical problems, see the Introduction for a discussion.
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periods during which the individual is enrolled in initial education. The flow budget
constraint of the individual who is still in school (t ≤ S) is therefore given by
A˙t = rAt − Ct − (1 − σ)P, 0 ≤ t ≤ S, (4)
where a dot denotes a time-derivative. Since A0 = 0, and Ct and P are both positive,
the individual accumulates debt in the first periods of his life. σ is the subsidy rate on
direct educational costs.
After graduation, the individual starts earning gross labor income W(S)Lt . The
flow budget constraints after graduation until retirement (S < t ≤ R) state that the
increase in financial assets should equal total interest income (which is negative while
individuals repay debts) plus net labor income (1 − τ)W(S)Lt , minus consumption
A˙t = rAt + (1 − τ)W(S)Lt − Ct , S < t ≤ R, (5)
where τ is the labor income tax rate. We assume for simplicity’s sake that interest
income is untaxed.
During retirement (R < t ≤ T ), the individual runs down his accumulated assets
for consumption purposes:
A˙t = rAt + (1 − τB)B − Ct , R < t ≤ T , (6)
where B is the constant retirement benefit, and τB denotes the rate at which retire-
ment benefits are taxed. One should interpret the pension benefit B as that part of
pension benefits that is actuarially completely nonneutral, since individuals only re-
ceive retirement benefits conditional upon full retirement. Any actuarially fair pen-
sion savings are covered by the voluntary saving decision. The individual has no
bequest motive and ends his life with zero wealth: AT = 0.
Integration of the asset accumulation constrains, and imposing the initial and ter-
minal conditions on financial wealth, gives the life-time budget constraint of the in-
dividual
∫ T
0
Ct exp(−rt)dt +
∫ S
0
(1 − σ)P exp(−rt)dt
=
∫ R
S
(1 − τ)W(S)Lt exp(−rt)dt +
∫ T
R
(1 − τB)B exp(−rt)dt. (7)
The individual maximizes life-time utility by choosing consumption, labor supply,
education, and retirement subject to the household budget constraint and the time
constraints.8 Using standard routines we obtain the Euler equation for consumption:
C˙t
Ct
= θt (r − ρ), 0 ≤ t ≤ T , (8)
8We assume that first-order conditions are necessary and sufficient. The latter condition is not necessarily
fulfilled due to the feedbacks between labor supply, retirement, and human capital accumulation. Only suf-
ficiently strong decreasing returns in schooling, and sufficiently concave leisure and retirement subutility
functions ensure an interior solution. We assume that these conditions are met.
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where θt ≡ (−U ′′(Ct )CtU ′(Ct ) )−1 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion. Similarly, we find a Euler equation for leisure:
L˙t
Lt = εt (r − ρ), S < t ≤ R, (9)
where εt ≡ (−V ′′(Lt )LtV ′(Lt ) )−1 > 0 is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure
demand. Leisure time increases over time as long as the interest rate is larger than the
pure rate of time preference (r > ρ).
The static labor supply equation is also standard, and given by
V ′(Lt )
U ′(Ct )
= (1 − τ)W(S), S < t ≤ R. (10)
The marginal willingness to demand leisure time decreases with the net wage rate
and increases with the level of taxation. The gross wage rate increases with skill level
S. Hence, this equation gives the first complementarity. Better-skilled workers sup-
ply more labor if the substitution effect dominates the income effect in labor supply
(which is the empirically plausible case, see also Blundell and MaCurdy 1999; and
Evers et al. 2008). Indeed, if labor supply is interpreted as the labor force participa-
tion rate, higher wages can explain why higher-educated workers also have higher
participation rates.
The optimal number of years in initial education follows from the first-order con-
ditions for education and labor supply:
∫ R
S
(1 − τ)W ′(S)Lt exp
(−r(t −S))dt = (1 − τ)W(S)
(
LS + 1 − LS
S
)
+ (1 −σ)P,
(11)
where S ≡ V ′(LS)LSV (LS) > 0 is the elasticity of the leisure subutility function at time S.
This is the modified Mincer equation stating that the net present value of marginal
returns to initial education (evaluated at the time S) should be equal to net mar-
ginal costs of an additional year of schooling. The latter comprise net forgone labor
earnings and direct, subsidized expenditures. Years spent in initial education increase
when the returns to human capital investments are larger. We again encounter the first
complementarity that returns to education increase when individuals supply more la-
bor during working-life (Lt larger). The second complementarity is that investments
in human capital increase when the working life is longer, and individuals retire later
(R larger). We have to note here that the returns at the end of the life cycle are heavily
discounted, so that expanding the retirement age only has small effects when discount
rates are substantial.
The term LS + 1−LSS originates from the fact that more time spent on initial edu-
cation lowers the time-span over which labor can be supplied or leisure can be con-
sumed; see the utility function (3). LS is associated with the marginal loss of forgone
labor earnings, and 1−LS
S
is associated with marginal forgone leisure time when in-
dividuals invest more time in initial education. In the absence of endogenous labor
supply during working-life, LS = 1, and this term cancels out. The same is true if the
subutility function over leisure V (LS) is linear, i.e., when S = 1. In that case, more
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time spent in initial education reduces the marginal value of working and leisure time
during working life equally.
Labor taxation reduces investments in initial education as long as direct costs are
positive (P > 0), and the subsidy rate is not equal to the tax rate (τ = σ ). If the
subsidy rate σ equals the tax rate on labor τ , taxation is neutral with respect to human
capital investments because all costs and benefits of human capital formation are
symmetrically affected by tax and subsidy rates. Labor taxation nevertheless reduces
labor supply (if the substitution effect dominates), and also reduces the retirement
age (again assuming dominant substitution effects). Hence, labor taxation indirectly
discourages investments in initial education by lowering the utilization rate of human
capital while working and shortening the payback period of investments in education.
Optimal retirement is given by
X′(T − R)
U ′(C0) exp(−rR) = (1 − τ)W(S)
(
(1 − )LR + 1 − LR
R
)
, (12)
where R ≡ V ′(LR)LRV (LR) > 0, and  ≡
(1−τB)B
(1−τ)W(S)LR denotes the net replacement rate of
retirement income in terms of final earnings.  is the implicit tax rate on continued
work due to nonactuarially fair pensions. The marginal willingness to pay for an ad-
ditional year in retirement should be equal to the marginal costs of an extra year in
retirement. The marginal benefit is the marginal rate of substitution between retire-
ment utility and consumption at the date of retirement. The marginal costs are given
by the value of the net forgone labor earnings in the last year on the labor market.
U ′(C0) captures wealth effects in the retirement decision. Richer individuals have a
lower marginal utility of income and retire earlier—ceteris paribus. The individual
has stronger incentives to retire later if he has more initial education S, since more
education raises labor earnings forgone during retirement. Note also that incentives to
retire are weaker when individuals utilize their skills better by supplying more labor
during working life (higher LR). The second complementarity is again that better-
skilled workers retire later when the income effect of higher skills are outweighed by
the substitution effects of higher skills.
Again, there is a term (1 − )LR + 1−LRR representing the impact of retirement
on the time-span over which individuals enjoy labor earnings and ordinary leisure;
see the utility function (3). (1 − )LR corresponds with the marginal loss of forgone
labor earnings, which are reduced one-for-one with the implicit tax on retirement due
to actuarially unfair pensions. 1−LR
S
measures the marginal value of forgone leisure
time when individuals retire earlier. In the absence of an endogenous leisure demand
decision and actuarially fair pensions (LR = 1 and  = 0), this term would vanish.
Similarly, the last term cancels out if the leisure subutility function V (LR) is linear
(R = 1), and pensions are actuarially fair ( = 0). Later retirement then augments
the marginal value of working and leisure time equally.
The labor tax directly distorts retirement decisions because retirement utility is not
taxed, whereas continued work is. This direct impact of labor taxation on retirement
is not often discussed in the literature on retirement (e.g., Gruber and Wise 1999).
Indeed, this literature mainly focuses on the implicit marginal tax rate on additional
years of work, , due to the presence of actuarially unfair (early) retirement incomes.
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Note that as long as net retirement benefits are taxed at lower rates than labor earnings
are (τB < τ ), the tax system also distorts the retirement decision as the actuarial
fairness of retirement benefits diminishes due to this asymmetric tax treatment. The
implicit tax  on continued work exacerbates the impact of the labor tax τ on the
decision to exit the labor market.
3 Simulations
How important is the impact of endogenous skill formation and retirement on the
overall elasticity of the tax base? How important are the life-cycle interactions be-
tween skill formation and labor market choices quantitatively? Furthermore, how do
welfare state policies, such as education subsidies and actuarially nonneutral pen-
sions, affect skill formation, skill utilization, and skill depreciation? This section
presents simulations of the model with some stylized policy settings. The baseline
version of the model is calibrated on empirically observed values of the endogenous
variables and policies, while using empirically grounded estimates for the main elas-
ticities.
For simulation purposes, we translate the previous continuous time model to a
discrete time setting. Utility is specified as
T∑
t=0
C
1−1/θ
t
1−1/θ
(1 + ρ)t −
R∑
t=S
γ
(1−Lt )1+1/ε
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)t + η
(T − R)1−1/β
1 − 1/β , (13)
θ, δ, β, ε, and η are all positive parameters. θ is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution in consumption. ε governs the inter-temporal wage elasticity of labor
supply. γ is a parameter for the preference for leisure. β is related to the elasticity of
retirement with respect to net final earnings. η is a parameter denoting the preference
for retirement.
The production function for human capital is
W(S) ≡ ASα, 0 < α < 1, A > 0. (14)
A denotes the productivity of time invested in human capital. A may be interpreted
as a measure for ability. We solve the model numerically, see the Appendix for more
details on the simulation procedure.
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters of the model. The time-span is set at 75
years, hence T = 75. We assume that individuals start their education at age 6. Hence,
individuals die at age 81. A pure rate of time preference of ρ = 0.02 is chosen, which
is fairly standard. The same is true for the real interest rate, which is set at r = 0.04.
After an extensive review of the scarce empirical literature, Trostel (1993) sets the
elasticity of the human capital production function at α = 0.6. We use a slightly lower
value of α = 0.55. The price of education P is 10 (thousand euro) per year, such that
direct costs of education are one quarter of total costs (see also Trostel 1993). At
baseline values, the individual’s gross labor earnings per year are 29 (thousand euro)
on average during working life.
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Table 1 Parameterization simulation model
Parameter Value Source
Preferences and technologies
Intertemporal elasticity consumption θ = 2 Calibrated: labor supply elasticity 0.2
Pure rate of time preference ρ = 0.02 Standard value
Intertemporal elasticity labor ε = 0.5 Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)
Leisure preference γ = 13 Calibrated: labor supply 87%
Elasticity of retirement β = 0.99 Duval (2004), Gruber and Wise (1999)
Retirement preference η = 7 Calibrated: retirement at age 60
Elasticity human capital α = 0.55 Trostel (1993)
Productivity human capital A = 10 Calibrated: 12 years education
Time horizon T = 75 Life span 81 years, education at age 6
Prices
Real interest rate r = 0.04 Standard value
Price per year of education P = 10 1/4 of total costs (Trostel 1993)
Policy variables
Labor tax τ = 0.5 OECD average
Education subsidy σ = 0.75 OECD average higher education
Implicit tax retirement  = 0.30 OECD average workers aged 55–64
Based on dozens of empirical studies, the meta-analysis by Evers et al. (2008)
suggests values for the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply of 0.1 for men
and 0.5 for women. We assume that it is equal to 0.2 in the base-line simulation.
If labor supply is interpreted as labor force participation, rather than hours worked,
the value for the elasticity is probably too low, because the extensive margin is typ-
ically more elastic than the intensive margin (Saez 2002). The Appendix shows that
the uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply (at zero nonlabor income) equals
(1 − 1/θ)(1/θ + 1/ε)−1. The intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption
θ and the intertemporal substitution elasticity of leisure ε thus jointly pin down the
uncompensated labor supply elasticity. Blundell and MaCurdy’s (1999) review sug-
gests values of the intertemporal elasticity of leisure between 0.5 and 1. Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1987) use a value of 0.8. We have set the intertemporal elasticity of substi-
tution at the lower bound of ε = 0.5. Thus, in order to ensure that the uncompensated
labor supply elasticity roughly equals 0.2, we set the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution in consumption at θ = 2, which is relatively high. Indeed, a value of θ = 1 is
often used in real business-cycle models; see, e.g., Lucas (1990). θ = 0.5 is suggested
by most empirical microeconomic research; see, for example, Attanasio and Weber
(1995). However, a too low value of θ gives implausibly low labor supply elastici-
ties. Indeed, a value of θ below unity even results in backward bending labor supply
curves (see Appendix). By setting θ = 2 we obtain realistic labor supply behavior
and, as a side-effect, avoid excessively large wealth effects in retirement. Since our
analysis does not focus on intertemporal distortions in consumption due to, for exam-
ple, capital income taxes, missing capital markets, or liquidity constraints; we do not
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expect to bias the simulation results by assuming θ = 2. With this parameterization,
the compensated wage elasticity of labor supply is equal to (1/θ + 1/ε)−1 = 0.4 at
zero nonlabor income (see Appendix).
The retirement elasticity is set at β = 0.99. The Frisch elasticity of retirement with
respect to the implicit tax on retirement (i.e., while holding wealth constant) equals
−β(T −R)/R. At a calibrated retirement age of R = 54 (age 60) the Frisch elasticity
of retirement with respect to the implicit tax is around −0.28. The estimates in Gruber
and Wise (1999), OECD (2004) and Duval (2004) imply that the uncompensated
elasticity of labor force participation of older workers with respect to the implicit
tax on retirement (including wealth and income effects) is approximately one-third.
The Appendix contains extensive sensitivity analyses by simulating the model with a
wide array of behavioral elasticities.
The baseline set of policy variables is τ = 0.5, σ = 0.75, and  = 0.3. These val-
ues match unweighted averages for a sample of 16 Continental European and Anglo-
Saxon countries (see Appendix). Total marginal tax wedges on labor income (includ-
ing employer contributions and local taxes) are 51% for a single household without
dependents which earns the average production wage (OECD 2007a). 79% is the
average of subsidies on higher education, which probably corresponds better to a
marginal subsidy than the average subsidy on all levels of education (OECD 2007b).
Gruber and Wise (1999), OECD (2004), and Duval (2004) show that the implicit
tax on retirement amounts to around 30% for an older worker aged between 55–65,
although there are substantial cross-country differences.9 The remaining parameters
(A, γ , η) are calibrated such that the individual is enrolled in education until age 18,
he retires at age 60, and spends 87% of his time endowment supplying labor after
graduation.
Tax revenues are absorbed by the government to finance spending on public goods
and are not rebated.10 In the base-line simulation, the share of noneducation, non-
pension spending is 30% of the present value of life-time income. Note that not only
standard income and substitution effects of tax, education, and pension policies will
matter in the simulations. Indeed, the tax and subsidy instruments do also affect the
education decision, which determines yearly labor earnings. Therefore, changes in
the level of education also cause income and wealth effects through their impact
on earnings, and thereby indirectly influence labor supply and retirement. Similarly,
changes in the retirement age affect life-time wealth, which causes wealth effects on
labor supply as well.
Figure 1 plots the simulated life-cycle labor supply patterns for changes in the
labor tax rate, education subsidy, and the implicit tax on retirement. Each panel shows
that individuals are enrolled in initial education for the first years of their lives, then
labor is supplied during working life, and the final years of life are spent in retirement.
The time path of labor supply during working lives is downward sloping over the life
9Gruber and Wise (1999) report the so-called “tax force” statistic, which corresponds to the sum of mar-
ginal tax wedges on retirement while working during ages 55–69. Dividing the “tax force” by 15 gives
a yearly average marginal tax wedge on retirement during working ages 55–69. OECD (2004) computes
marginal tax wedges on retirement which are around 20% (40%) on average for 55–59 (60–64) year old
workers. Duval (2004, p. 33) calculates that average implicit tax rates in OECD countries are equal to 30%.
10Implicitly, we assume public goods enter in a completely separable fashion in the utility function.
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cycle as leisure rises over time, see the Euler equation for leisure (9).11 In the baseline
simulation, labor supply at the end of the life cycle is around 60%. If labor supply is
interpreted as the employment rate, the downward sloping path matches falling labor
force participation rates over the life cycle quite well (OECD 2006).
The simulations show that the policy environment is crucial to understand choices
made over the life cycle. However, from these graphs alone we cannot infer to what
extent these effects are driven by the direct impact of taxes on labor, education, and
retirement or by their interactions. To disentangle the direct and interaction effects,
we computed all (uncompensated and compensated) elasticities of labor supply, ed-
ucation, and retirement with respect to all the policy variables. The uncompensated
elasticities are calculated by changing a policy variable and changing noneducation
and nonpension spending to keep the public budget balanced. The compensated elas-
ticities are computed by keeping life-time utility fixed at the baseline utility level
with lump-sum transfers/taxes, which are financed by adjustments in noneducation
and nonpension spending.
We calculated the elasticities that allow for the full effect of interactions between
labor, education, and retirement, and the same elasticities where the interactions have
been switched off. The latter is achieved by treating only one of the variables as
endogenous, and by fixing the other two variables at the levels of the baseline sim-
ulation. Furthermore, we computed the uncompensated and compensated elasticities
of the total tax base (T B) for each policy instrument in all these cases. As a mea-
sure for the tax base, we take average yearly labor earnings over the entire life cycle.
Hence, this measure for the tax base is sensitive to changes in labor force entry and
exit. Table 2 shows the elasticities and reveals a number of important insights.
• Realistic elasticities—The first thing to note is that the calibration produces realis-
tic values for the (un)compensated elasticities of education, labor, and retirement in
the absence of interactions. With exogenous education and retirement, the uncom-
pensated tax elasticity of labor supply is equal to 0.18 (in absolute value). Thus,
our approximation to fix the wage elasticity at 0.2 has been reasonably accurate.
Moreover, the approximation for the compensated wage elasticity of labor sup-
ply of 0.40 is exact. Furthermore, the uncompensated (compensated) retirement
elasticity—at exogenous education and labor supply—with respect to the retire-
ment wedge is 0.18 (0.17) in absolute value, which is in the ballpark of empirical
findings, albeit a bit on the low side. Not surprisingly, the uncompensated (compen-
sated) education elasticity with respect to the subsidy is 0.48 (0.48)—at exogenous
labor and retirement—which matches the elasticity of the earnings function (0.55)
quite closely.
• Interactions important for tax elasticities—Panel A confirms that higher labor
taxes result in rather large reductions in education, labor supply, and retirement
ages. When besides labor supply, education, and retirement are also endogenous,
11There are small kinks in the labor supply paths, because the model is discrete, but the education and
retirement choices are treated as continuous variables in the simulations. Therefore, the available time-
endowment in a given year is adjusted so as to capture the nondiscreteness in education or retirement. For
example, if an individual is enrolled for 12.2 years in education, the available time endowment in the 13th
year is adjusted to 1 − 0.2 = 0.8. Similar adjustments are made for retirement.
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we see that the uncompensated labor supply elasticity with respect to the tax in-
creases from 0.18 to 0.26 in absolute value. Consequently, interaction effects be-
tween labor supply, education, and retirement are important and drive up the tax
elasticity of labor by almost 50%. See also Jacobs (2005) and Bovenberg and Ja-
cobs (2005). The education and retirement elasticities with respect to taxation are
also substantially affected by interaction effects. The uncompensated education
elasticity with respect to the tax rate almost doubles from 0.16 to 0.30, whereas the
retirement elasticity changes by 50% from 0.10 to 0.15. All elasticities are taken in
absolute values. Substitution effects dominate income effects in labor supply and
retirement since we find negative uncompensated elasticities.
• Interactions not important for subsidy and implicit retirement tax elasticities—The
subsidy on education only directly influences education choices. Similarly, the im-
plicit tax on retirement only directly influences retirement. The cross-elasticities of
education subsidies and retirement taxes are only driven by income effects, since
the compensated cross-elasticities are zero. These findings illustrate that interac-
tion effects are only important when one policy instrument affects multiple choice
margins, as taxes do, but not when the policy instrument only affects one margin,
such as subsidies and retirement benefits. This holds true for both uncompensated
and compensated changes.
• Elasticity of the tax base corresponds directly with elasticities of labor supply or
retirement when the other margins are fixed. This is not true for education—If ed-
ucation and retirement are fixed, the elasticity of the total tax base (with respect to
any policy variable) is, not surprisingly, equal to the labor supply elasticity for both
compensated and uncompensated changes. The same holds true for retirement, as
long as education and labor are fixed. For education, this is different because it
is an investment. A higher level of education partially erodes the tax base, since
individuals reduce the length of their working career. Hence, the elasticities of the
tax base are lower than that of education when labor supply and retirement are
exogenous.
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the tax rate increases substantially due to
interactions—The tax base is far more elastic when, besides labor supply, educa-
tion and retirement are also endogenous. In particular, the absolute value of the un-
compensated tax elasticity of the tax base rises from 0.18—with only endogenous
labor supply—to 0.46—with endogenous learning and retirement as well. This is
a 150% increase. Therefore, the direct impact of taxes on education and retirement
are also important, as can be witnessed from their uncompensated elasticities. This
finding is the application of the Le Châtelier Principle (Diamond and Mirrlees
2002) because the elasticity of the tax base increases substantially when more than
one decision margin is affected by income taxation. Moreover, all decisions mu-
tually reinforce each other. Quite surprisingly, our findings of the uncompensated
tax base elasticity are completely in line with the empirical estimate of 0.4 for the
US by Saez and Gruber (2003).
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the subsidy rate increases substantially
due to impacts on labor and retirement—The uncompensated subsidy elasticity of
the tax base, including the interactions between labor, education, and retirement is
0.20. This is more than twice as high as the tax base elasticity without the impact of
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education on labor and retirement (0.09). This is illustrated in Panel B. The subsidy
only directly increases human capital investments, but does not directly affect labor
supply and retirement. However, higher education subsidies indirectly boost labor
supply and the retirement age as individuals become better educated. The costs of
leisure and retirement increase with the level of human capital. Consequently, rel-
atively strong effects on labor supply and retirement ages are found. Higher levels
of education also result in higher incomes and larger life-time wealth, which raises
the demand for leisure and stimulates earlier retirement. However, these income
effects are outstripped by dominant substitution effects. Human capital policy can
therefore be effective in offsetting the disincentives on skill formation created by
taxation and actuarially unfair retirement schemes. Education subsidies help to
contain the efficiency costs of redistribution by exempting skill formation from
explicit and implicit taxes (cf. Bovenberg and Jacobs 2005).
• Elasticity of the tax base with respect to the implicit tax on retirement increases
little due to impacts on education and retirement—The uncompensated elasticity
of the tax base with respect to the implicit tax on retirement including the interac-
tions between labor, education, and retirement is 0.22. This is only slightly larger
than the tax base elasticity without interactions with labor and retirement (0.19).
See also panel C. This figure shows that human capital investments and retirement
decisions interact only slightly because returns to education at the end of the life
cycle are heavily discounted. Therefore, the feedback mechanism between edu-
cation and retirement is asymmetric; more education boosts retirement more than
later retirement boosts education. Labor supply responds marginally to a lower re-
tirement wedge. Substitution effects in wages due to a higher education level are
relatively small, and income and wealth effects—due to a longer working life—
are relatively large. Both effects roughly cancel out as indicated by a near-zero
uncompensated elasticity of labor.
• Taxation much more distortionary than commonly understood—The compensated
elasticities, which measure the efficiency losses of taxation are shown in the table
as well. Again, we confirm that the compensated elasticities of labor, education,
and retirement (with respect to any policy instrument) substantially rise due to
the interaction effects. The impact is, however, more modest in comparison with
the uncompensated elasticities. The reason is that the feedbacks between learning,
working, and retirement are only driven by the uncompensated effects of taxes. In-
deed, if the uncompensated labor supply elasticity were zero, labor supply would
not change in response to a tax change, and there would be no interaction effects
with learning and retirement. The same is true for retirement, but not for educa-
tion; the reason being that compensated and uncompensated elasticities for edu-
cation are always equal, since there are no income effects in education choices.
Once education and retirement are allowed to be endogenous, we find a very high
compensated elasticity of the tax base. In particular, the compensated elasticity of
the tax base increases to 0.85 (an increase of more than 110%) once education and
retirement are allowed to be endogenous. The endogeneity of labor supply, educa-
tion, and retirement can therefore be an alternative to the “social multiplier,” which
has been put forward by Alesina et al. (2005), to explain European labor market
performance.
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Table 3 Policy packages for Continental European, Nordic, Mediterranean, and Anglo-Saxon countries
τ  σ
Continental Europe (Netherlands, Belgium, France, Germany) 0.60 0.40 0.83
Mediterranean countries (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) 0.50 0.44 0.84
Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland) 0.55 0.38 0.95
Anglo-Saxon countries (UK, Canada, Australia, US) 0.41 0.14 0.54
Sources: Total marginal taxes on personal income, single worker without children earning 100% average
production wage in 2006 (OECD 2007a). Education subsidies are computed as the proportion of public
expenditure on educational institutions for tertiary education in 2004 (OECD 2007b). Implicit tax rates on
retirement are the averages of for a 60-year old and 65-year old single worker with average earnings in
1999 (Duval 2004, p. 23)
Table 4 Observed data and simulated outcomes
Observed L40 Simulated L40 Observed S Simulated S Observed R Simulated R
Continental Europe 0.60 0.67 12.3 12.0 59.4 54.6
Mediterranean
countries 0.72 0.70 9.8 12.5 62.2 55.0
Nordic countries 0.64 0.65 13.0 13.2 62.4 54.7
Anglo-Saxon 0.73 0.73 13.1 11.4 62.6 62.5
Sources: Hours worked are yearly average hours worked from OECD (2006). We have converted observed
annual hours work in fractions of a total time endowment of 2,416 hours per year. This endowment is cal-
culated by taking the Anglo-Saxon countries as the reference point and assuming that the simulated labor
supply of a 40-year old worker equals the observed number of hours worked in the US. Data on average
years of education in the population are taken from De la Fuente and Doménech (2006). Retirement ages
are taken from OECD (2005b) and apply to males only
As a final exercise, we have simulated the model with a set of policy parame-
ters that correspond with the policies of “Anglo-Saxon,” “Continental European,”
“Mediterranean,” and “Nordic” countries. Table 3 lists the policy packages for each
block of countries, which are based on the (unweighed) averages of each group (see
the Appendix for the underlying data).12
Panel D plots the simulated packages. These admittedly crude simulations show
that only a few policy parameters are able to mimic observed life-cycle labor market
behavior quite well. Table 4 confronts the simulated outcomes with the data. A caveat
is in order here because the cross-sectional averages are not directly comparable to
outcomes from our life-cycle model. The simulated results for education and retire-
ment are not precise estimates for cross-sectional averages if these variables have
not reached their steady-state values in the data. Certainly, this is the case for educa-
tion and retirement. In most advanced countries, education levels have dramatically
increased and retirement ages have fallen severely during the postwar period.
12Many countries have recently introduced reforms so as to make their pension systems actuarially more
fair. The data on the implicit tax on retirement apply to 1999, and may therefore be slightly outdated.
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Bearing in mind the caveat, it is striking to find a very close correspondence be-
tween actual hours worked and simulated hours worked. Prescott’s (2004) claim that
Europeans work much less than Americans due to differences in tax levels can be
fully explained by taxation alone. Neither education subsidies nor implicit taxes on
retirement can explain this finding. Differences in the level of education subsidies
would boost labor supply in Continental Europe compared to Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. Hence, this explanation goes astray. Furthermore, implicit taxes on retirement
hardly affect labor supply, as we have demonstrated earlier, see also Table 2. In con-
trast to Prescott (2004), our simulations are based on standard values for the labor
supply elasticity; see also the discussion in Alesina et al. (2005).
Average educational attainment is highest in Nordic countries due to high educa-
tion subsidies, and the simulated figure corresponds well with observed average years
of education. Also, educational outcomes in Continental Europe match observed av-
erages closely. The model does not predict average years of education in the US and
Mediterranean countries well. Apart from cohort effects, this may be caused as well
by substantial heterogeneity in education systems; we assume that education systems
are identical across countries.
The simulations also substantially underestimate actual retirement ages in Euro-
pean countries, but is very accurate for the Anglo-Saxon countries. We do not think
that the retirement elasticity is the culprit as it has been set at a relatively conserv-
ative value. The more probable explanation is the presence of cohort effects in the
retirement data. Older cohorts had much less generous (early) retirement schemes
than younger ones. Consequently, cross-sectional retirement data do not yet fully re-
flect the adverse incentive effects of (early) retirement schemes. Note that the total
(implicit and explicit) tax wedges on retirement are 76%, 72%, and 79% for Con-
tinental European, Mediterranean, and Nordic countries, respectively. Anglo-Saxon
countries only have a total tax wedge on retirement of 55%. Consequently, retirement
decisions in Europe are extremely distorted, and small changes in taxes or retirement
schemes result in substantial impact on the retirement age in our simulations. These
model simulations vindicate the concerns of many policy makers who are reforming
(early) retirement schemes. Moreover, it demonstrates the potential importance of the
explicit tax on retirement choices.
A final remark is in order here. The simulated outcomes are as good as the model
that produces them. The assumption of perfect clearing of the labor market can be
criticized for being less relevant to the Continental European context. Higher mar-
ginal tax rates—for given average tax rates—typically reduce distortions in noncom-
petitive labor markets by punishing wage demands of unions, by lowering the power
of efficiency-wages, or by reducing the bargaining power of workers in search mod-
els. However, higher average tax rates—for given tax progression—generally exacer-
bate labor market distortions by pushing the wage further above the market clearing
level. See also Layard et al. (1991), Bovenberg and van der Ploeg (1994), Pissarides
(1998), Sørensen (1999), Bovenberg (2006), and van der Ploeg (2006). Both mech-
anisms are clearly relevant for the Continental European countries, since they have
both high marginal and high average tax burdens. Further, most of the above men-
tioned papers only analyze the extensive margin of labor supply, not the intensive
margin. Thus, for those who are indeed in the labor market, the neoclassical labor
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supply model might still be the relevant one to describe labor supply behavior—even
in Continental European countries.
4 Conclusions
This paper developed and simulated a life-cycle model with endogenous skill for-
mation, endogenous labor supply, and endogenous retirement. We show that there
are important feedbacks between education, labor supply, and retirement. Working
more hours increases the utilization rate of acquired human capital. Later retire-
ment implies that human capital depreciates less quickly. Moreover, skilled work-
ers face weaker incentives to work less or retire early. Labor taxation not only
distorts labor supply, but also education and retirement decisions. Actuarially un-
fair pensions exacerbate existing labor tax distortions on retirement. Education sub-
sidies cushion the adverse impacts of taxation on learning, working, and retire-
ment.
We simulated the life-cycle model with a realistic set of behavioral elasticities.
Our simulations are able to mimic observed patterns of education, labor supply,
and retirement quite well. In fact, our simulations bolster Prescott’s (2004) claim
that high taxes are responsible for lackluster labor market performance in Europe
while not relying on implausibly high labor supply elasticities. We demonstrate
that both compensated and uncompensated elasticities of the tax base are more
than twice as high as standard labor supply elasticities. In particular, the uncom-
pensated (compensated) elasticities of the aggregate tax base are as large as 0.46
(0.85). Furthermore, life-cycle interactions between learning, working, and retire-
ment are quantitatively important and they raise all elasticities substantially. Wel-
fare state policies therefore involve much larger distortions than is commonly per-
ceived.
Reforms in labor markets, pension systems, and tax-benefit systems can thus
have very substantial welfare gains. Indeed, if eligibility for various types of ben-
efits and early-retirement schemes becomes more restricted, pension plans are made
actuarially fairer, and distorting taxes are lowered, labor market performance im-
proves directly. However, these policies also result in nontrivial efficiency gains
because implicit tax wedges on skill formation are lowered, as the incentives im-
prove to learn, to work, and to retire later. Moreover, higher investment in hu-
man capital boosts labor market performance, since better-skilled workers partic-
ipate more and retire later. Human capital subsidies are consequently a vital part
of modern welfare state policies to counter large direct and implicit taxes on
skill formation arising from labor market distortions and actuarially unfair pension
schemes.
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Appendix
Numerical solution
The Lagrangian for maximization of life-time utility is given by
V =
T∑
t=0
C
1−1/θ
t
1−1/θ
(1 + ρ)t −
R∑
t=S
γ
L
1+1/ε
t
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)t + η
(T − R)1−1/β
1 − 1/β
+ λ
[
R∑
t=S
(1 − τ)ASαLt
(1 + r)t +
T∑
t=R
(1 − τB)B
(1 + r)t −
T∑
t=0
Ct
(1 + r)t −
S∑
t=0
(1 − σ)P
(1 + r)t
]
.
(15)
First-order conditions for consumption, labor supply, education, and retirement
are
∂V
∂Ct
= C
−1/θ
t
(1 + ρ)t −
λ
(1 + r)t = 0, (16)
∂V
∂Lt
= − γL
1/ε
t
(1 + ρ)t +
λ(1 − τ)ASα
(1 + r)t = 0, (17)
∂V
∂S
= γ
LS
1+1/ε
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)S −
λ(1 − τ)ASαLS
(1 + r)S + λ
R∑
t=S
(1 − τ)αASα−1Lt
(1 + r)t −
λ(1 − σ)P
(1 + r)S = 0,
(18)
∂V
∂R
= −γ
LR
1+1/ε
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)R − η(T − R)
−1/β + λ(1 − τ)AS
αLR
(1 + r)R −
λ(1 − τB)B
(1 + r)R = 0. (19)
The first equation yields the Euler equation for consumption:
Ct+1 =
(
1 + r
1 + ρ
)θ
Ct . (20)
Using the first two first-order conditions, we obtain the labor supply equation:
Lt =
(
1
γ
(1 − τ)ASαC−1/θt
)ε
. (21)
The education equation follows from rewriting the first term using the labor supply
equation, L
1
ε
S = 1γ (1 − τ)ASαC−1/θS , and the first-order condition for consumption,
C
−1/θ
S = λ(1+ρ)
S
(1+r∗)S :
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γ
LS
1+1/ε
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)S =
γ
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)S LSL
1/ε
S
= C
−1/θ
S
(1 + ρ)S
(1 − τ)ASαLS
1 + 1/ε =
λ
(1 + r)S
(1 − τ)ASαLS
1 + 1/ε . (22)
Substitution of the last result in the first-order condition for education gives
R∑
t=S
(1 − τ)αASα−1Lt
(1 + r)t−S =
(1 − τ)ASαLS
1 + ε + (1 − σ)P. (23)
The retirement equation follows using similar steps to eliminate the first term from
the first-order condition:
γ LR
1+1/ε
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)R =
γ
1+1/ε
(1 + ρ)R LRL
1/ε
R
= C
−1/θ
R
(1 + ρ)R
(1 − τ)ASαLR
1 + 1/ε =
λ
(1 + r)R
(1 − τ)ASαLR
1 + 1/ε . (24)
Substitution of the last result in the first-order condition for retirement yields
η(T − R)−1/β
λ(1 + r)−R =
(1 − τ)ASαLR
1 + ε − (1 − τB)B. (25)
Using the implicit tax on retirement,  ≡ (1−τB)B
(1−τ)W(S)LR , we obtain
η(T − R)−1/β
λ(1 + r)−R =
(
1
1 + ε − 
)
(1 − τ)ASαLR. (26)
This model can be reduced into a system of three nonlinear equations—the first-
order condition for retirement, the first-order condition for education, and the house-
hold budget constraint—in three unknowns C0, S, and R. For given C0, the Euler
equation for consumption fully specifies the time-path of consumption. For educa-
tion level S and initial consumption C0 (and, therefore, Ct ) we can derive the full
time-path of labor supply. The education decision is a function of the retirement de-
cision R only. The retirement decision is fully determined by education S and initial
consumption C0. Hence, for a given level of initial consumption C0 the first-order
conditions for education and retirement jointly determine optimal years of education
and the retirement age. The level of consumption then follows from the household
budget constraint. We numerically solve this set of equations subject to the Euler
equations for consumption and labor supply.
Notice that we have treated the education and retirement decisions as continu-
ous variables in these first-order conditions. The reason is that avoiding integer con-
straints simplifies the computations considerably. Therefore, we must adjust the avail-
able time endowment in a given year to correct for the nondiscreteness in education
or retirement. For example, if an individual is enrolled for 12.2 years in education,
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the time endowment available for leisure or working in the 13th year is reduced to
1 − 0.2 = 0.8. Similarly, when an individual retires at 50.6 years, we adjusted the
available time endowment in the 51st year to 1 − 0.6 = 0.4. This adjustment in time
endowments explains the small kinks in the labor supply paths.
Elasticities
Standard labor supply models are often cast in static frameworks, where nonlabor
incomes do not change over time. This is not the case in a life-cycle setting, and this
generally affects the expressions for labor supply elasticities. Only when nonlabor
incomes are zero (e.g., due to a liquidity constraint), one can associate empirically
measured static elasticities with the (un)compensated labor supply elasticities de-
rived in a dynamic framework. We proceed by assuming that nonlabor income is zero
(i.e., no savings or debt and no lump-sum transfers). The simulations reveal that the
presence of nonlabor incomes does not affect the sizes of the elasticities much. See
Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for a more elaborate discussion on these matters.
When nonlabor income is zero, the household decides how much to work during
each period. The corresponding static labor supply problem in each period is given
by
max
Ct ,Lt
U(Ct ) + V (1 − Lt) = C
1−1/θ
t
1 − 1/θ − γ
L
1+1/ε
t
1 + 1/ε , s.t. Ct = wLt, (27)
where w ≡ (1−τ)W(S). The first-order condition for labor supply is as before (omit-
ting time subscripts)
V ′(1 − L)
U ′(C)
= −γL
1/ε
C−1/θ
= w. (28)
Log-linearizing the first-order condition and the household budget constraint yields
dC
C
+ θ
ε
dL
L
= θ dw
w
, (29)
and
dC
C
= dw
w
+ dL
L
. (30)
These expressions can be solved to find the relative change in labor in terms of the
relative change in the real wage. The uncompensated wage elasticity of labor supply
u is then given by
u ≡ dL/L
dw/w
= 1 − 1/θ
1/θ + 1/ε . (31)
The compensated elasticity is derived as follows. First, we totally differentiate
the utility function so as to have no change in utility. Next, we use the first-order
condition for labor supply to obtain
dC = w dL. (32)
276 B. Jacobs
Hence, using the household budget constraint, we find
dC
C
= w
C
dL = dL
L
. (33)
Substitution of the latter result in the linearized first-order condition and solving for
the relative change in labor supply gives the compensated wage elasticity
c ≡ dL/L
dw/w
= 1
1/θ + 1/ε . (34)
Sensitivity analysis
This Appendix simulates the baseline model for a wide array of behavioral elastici-
ties. Figure 2 gives the outcomes. Panel A gives the outcomes when elasticity of the
human capital production function is varied between α = 0.2 and α = 0.7. A higher
human capital elasticity increases the returns to education and entry in the labor mar-
ket is delayed because more years are invested in initial education. As the wage rate
during the working career increases, labor supply increases due to a dominant substi-
tution effect which can be seen from the upward shift of the labor supply schedule.
Also, retirement is substantially delayed when skill levels increase, as higher forgone
labor earnings render earlier retirement less attractive. Clearly, skill formation is both
complementary to skill utilization (labor supply) and slower skill depreciation (later
retirement).
Panel B shows the simulation results in which the intertemporal elasticity of labor
supply is varied from ε = 0.1 to ε = 1.25. A higher elasticity has a number of effects.
First, the labor supply schedule rotates clockwise as individuals are more willing to
substitute leisure intertemporally. Second, as the labor supply schedule rotates, av-
erage skill utilization falls because less labor is supplied during working life. Skill
depreciation also increases as a higher ε results in earlier retirement because forgone
wages during retirement decrease when substantially less labor is supplied at the end
of the working career. As skill utilization falls and skill depreciation increases, initial
investment in human capital is reduced. Third, a larger ε increases the wage elasticity
of labor supply, and this gives stronger incentives to invest in initial education. Ap-
parently, this effect is weaker than the negative impacts of a shorter working career
and lower average labor supply.
Panel C gives simulations in which the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
consumption θ is changed from θ = 0.5 to θ = 2.5. This parameter has a strong
impact on labor market outcomes. Indeed, compensated labor supply and retire-
ment elasticities substantially increase as θ rises (see the Appendix). This results
in higher labor supply and later retirement. Hence, the incentives for investment in
human capital increase on both accounts. Second, income and wealth effects dimin-
ish when θ increases. This implies that uncompensated elasticities also increase (see
the Appendix). Consequently, labor supply is boosted and retirement delayed, which
results in more initial education.
Panel D shows how the outcomes are affected when the retirement elasticity is
varied between β = 0.25 and β = 1.75. Clearly, a substantial impact of the retirement
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elasticity on the retirement age are found. This is the consequence of the high total
(explicit and implicit) marginal tax wedge on retirement of 1− (1− τ)(1−) = 65%
in the baseline scenario. Small changes in the retirement elasticity then cause large
behavioral changes. As retirement ages are lower, returns to education decrease, and
investments in human capital diminish. The impact is moderate mainly due to heavily
discounting of more distant income streams. The impact on labor supply is very small.
Earlier retirement causes a wealth effect, which boosts labor supply, whereas less
education causes a substitution effect, which depresses labor supply.
Data policy parameters
τ  s
Netherlands 0.51 – 0.79
Belgium 0.66 0.51 0.87
France 0.56 0.61 0.81
Germany 0.66 0.09 0.87
Portugal 0.47 0.14 0.92
Spain 0.46 0.63 0.77
Italy 0.52 0.54 0.72
Greece 0.54 – 0.97
Denmark 0.49 – 0.97
Norway 0.51 0.31 0.97
Sweden 0.63 0.40 0.89
Finland 0.55 0.43 0.96
Australia 0.35 0.21 0.48
Canada 0.41 0.11 0.56
United Kingdom 0.41 0.18 0.70
United States 0.34 0.13 0.43
Sources: Marginal total tax wedge on personal income for a single worker without children earning 100%
average production wage in 2006 (OECD 2007a). Education subsidies are computed as the proportions
of public expenditure on educational institutions for tertiary education in 2004 (OECD 2007b). Implicit
tax rates on retirement are the averages of for a 60-year old and 65-year old single worker with average
earnings in 1999 (Duval 2004, p. 23)
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